Volcker says let 'em fail

Paul Volcker, former Fed Chairman and current adviser to President Obama, told the Senate Banking Committee that hedge funds and private equity funds should be allowed to profit and fail on their own, without government support.

Which is how capitalism should work, and hence, sound policy. The problem is that charities, foundations, schools, churches, states, and municipalities who speculated in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives will go bankrupt when these toxic assets sink in value. Why exactly did these entities "invest" in these swaps? Who was minding the fence?

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=axxnPYqTocfY

The true cost of closing failed banks

The FDIC's true cost of closing failed banks into receivership is much higher than initially calculated, thanks to the FASB's "pretend and extend" false accounting methods. This "cooking of the books" throws out GAAP "mark to market" accounting, and overstates the value of toxic assets, in an attempt to feign bank solvency. In the final analysis, this will just be another larger burden on the US taxpayer.

Jim’s Mailbox

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Information released by the FDIC in connection with each new bank closing has been giving us a peek into the real condition of U.S. banks one year after the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) suspended fair value accounting requirements. Across the board, we are seeing that banks have radically over-valued their least liquid assets on the basis of a fantasy called “hold to maturity.”

Banks’ fantasy valuations are put to the test when it becomes incumbent upon the FDIC to close the bank and protect depositors’ assets. At that stage, the FDIC has to find a willing buyer for the assets and fair market value is established. As a result, it is now costing the FDIC unprecedented amounts to close banks.

The problem actually goes one step further. As we know, the government’s current economic policy is one of Manipulation of Perspective Economics (“MOPE”) and Pretend and Extend. MOPE does not permit too much bad news to be released at any one time, and Pretend and Extend puts problems off to the future on a presumption that conditions will be quickly improving.

It would be too much bad news all at once to let it be known what banks’ fantasy-valued assets are actually worth. Therefore, instead of selling off banks’ assets “as is” and taking its lumps all at once, the FDIC is now routinely entering into loss-share agreements as to virtually all the assets sold. That allows the FDIC to not have to book the full extent of its losses at the time each bank is closed, but is also leading to the FDIC taking on the risk of huge future losses.

The FDIC is already broke, so any future losses it takes on are liabilities of the U.S. public. The combined policies of MOPE and Pretend and Extend are once again making it inevitable that quantitative easing must continue indefinitely.

Robert Rubin on the economy

Wow, Robert Rubin finally speaks, after stepping down from his perch at Citigroup. According to a few independent thinkers, Rubin was one of the main instigators in the cause of the financial and economic crises we find ourselves in. The former Treasury Secretary formerly headed up Goldman Sachs and Citigroup, encouraging banks to leverage up their balance sheets to increase dubious earnings via the use of derivatives, which ended up being toxic assets. We all know how that drunken party turned out.

His progeny in the ensuing bank bailouts include former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson (also, formerly of Goldman Sachs), top Obama financial advisor Lawrence Summers, and current Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, among other well-placed government bureaucrats and bankers.

The editorial actually gives fair warning to the approaching storm, even if it lacks any mea culpa for past misdeeds. I guess omission is a form of honesty.

http://www.newsweek.com/id/225623/page/1

First, there must be sound fiscal and monetary policies. The United States faces projected 10-year federal budget deficits that seriously threaten its bond market, exchange rate, economy, and the economic future of every American worker and family. Those risks are exacerbated by the context of those deficits: a low household-savings rate, even after recent increases; large funding requirements for federal debt maturities every year; heavy overweighting of dollar-denominated assets in foreign portfolios; worsened fiscal prospects in the decades after the current 10-year budget period; and competing claims for capital to fund deficits in other countries.

The conventional concern here is that private investment will be crowded out, which would result in a reduction of productivity, competitiveness, and growth. In addition, the very early 1990s showed that unsound fiscal conditions can have a symbolic effect that broadly undermines business and consumer confidence. But finally, and far more dangerously, our bond and currency markets could react with severe distress to fears about imbalances in the supply and demand for capital in the years ahead or about the possibilities of inflation. Those effects have been averted so far by a number of factors: large inflows of capital from abroad into Treasury securities; concerns about other major currencies; the low level of private demand for capital; and the psychological state of the market. But this cannot continue indefinitely, and change can occur with great force—and unpredictable timing.

Read Matt Taibbi's scathing article on Obama's big sellout and the pandering to big Wall Street bankers--at the expense and hoodwinking of tax payers. Robert Rubin is a central figure in the web of lies, deception, and pilfering.

http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/31234647/obamas_big_sellout

The $1.8 trillion question

Quick--what does the acronym "ABCPMMFLF" stand for? In a banking world gone mad, when opaqueness trumps clarity, and complexity usurps simplicity, deception becomes masked by confusion.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aAmfkLEyMPYM&pid=20601109

By the way, so there's no misunderstanding, it stands for: "Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility." Here is proof from the Fed's own website:

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/abcpmmmf.htm

Government agencies have a real love affair with the alphabet soup when they want to confuse the public--or hide the fact that they are buying toxic bank assets on behalf of the American taxpayer.

Warren Buffett on deficit spending

Warren Buffett, of Berkshire Hathaway fame, was recently the Charlie Rose talk show. Here is an exchange:

Charlie Rose: This question is asked frequently: Will at some point the deficit and the debt and the decline of the dollar get to a point that people who hold our debt will no longer want to buy and then we're in a crisis?

Warren Buffett: We cannot keep running fiscal deficits like we are currently without having a lot of consequences over time... If you are running a $1.4 trillion deficit, even if you are exporting $400 billion of I.O.U.s in effect to the rest of the world, that leaves another trillion. And you know, the domestic savers are not going to come up with a trillion... so these numbers are unsustainable over time, what we're doing. It is true, though, that if you keep flooding the world with your debt and people see your fiscal policies are sort of out of control, they're going to get less and less and less enthused about your debt. And then, one of two things happen. Either you keep paying more and more to roll over that debt or you start monetizing it like crazy...

The Federal Reserve Bank has been monetizing the debt since March, 2009, catalyzing a rally in equities, commodities, and bonds to a lesser extent. It keeps short-term interest rates artificially low, in an attempt to stimulate the economy. As it did in the early 2000's under former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, it also created a massive bubble in certain asset classes, namely the housing market and equities.

With government bailouts and buying of collaterized debt securities, toxic assets have been shifted from the private sector (banks) to the public sector (government agency and US Treasury debts). The mortgage problems haven't been solved--it just shifted to the FHA. And when the bubble in government securities bursts, foreign sovereign governments won't be there to pick up the pieces.

Video on the financial crisis...

and why we're not out of the woods yet.

http://www.zerohedge.com/article/janet-tavakoli-why-meltdown-risk-now-greater-it-was-2007

Why the economy still stinks

Despite proclamations of green shoots, a pending recovery (and a surging stock market), I am skeptical of any economic recovery. Here are a couple articles on two common themes: bank insolvency and lack of transparency of toxic assets, and under-reporting of unemployment:

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=a5BsXz90CMso

http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/17/news/economy/unemployment_benefits/index.htm

Profitable bulemia

The scenario of banks downgrading each other's balance sheets due to opaque accounting of toxic assets is understandable--they are competitors after all. If misery loves company, one could argue perhaps they should be cheering each other on in their attempts to restore their balance sheets to solvency.

But there's an interesting twist in this game of mutual cannibalism: not only are they throwing stones at each other's glass houses, they are also betting on their own demise. Let me repeat: banks are profiting from bets against their own solvency.

Here's an excerpt from The Daily Reckoning:

But something magic happened in the fixed income trading group for Citi. This is pure gold if you like arcane financial statements packed with fictional earnings. If you dig into the quarterly report, you'll learn than fixed income trading revenues were boosted by a "net $2.5 billion positive CVA on derivative positions, excluding monoclines, mainly due to the widening of Citi's CDS spread.

That takes some sorting out. A CVA is a "credit value adjustment." As you can learn here, it's the credit risk premium of a derivative contract. Once you sort it out, you learn that Citi "made" $2.5 billion on a derivatives position designed to profit when the companies own credit default swaps spreads widen.

Or, in plain English, Citi profited because it made a bet that the cost of insuring itself against a default would go up. The credit default swap market is the place where you can bet on the credit worthiness of a firm, or, essentially, the chance that a firm might default on its bonds. Citi appears to have reported a $2.5 billion trading gain in the fourth quarter precisely because the market thought the company stood a good chance of failing (hence the widening CDS spread).

As far as we can tell, if you use this kind of perverted logic, the closer Citi gets to bankruptcy, the more money it would "make" on its derivatives. That shows you how bogus the quarterly number was. The company reported declining revenues in its core banking and lending activities. But thanks to fixed income and this handy $2.5 billion CVA, the company was able to report $1.5 billion in net income.

The financial bazaar has truly turned bizarre.

What to do about Toxic Assets

I've never professed to be an economist, and I know little about politics and economic policy. I do try to apply common sense, sprinkled in with morsels of demand/supply dynamics and market timing. I've never proffered up solutions to our global financial crisis due to its depth and severity, but it's gotten to the point where I feel the need to throw my hat into the wring. So here goes:

Credit default swaps (cds), which basically insured the collaterized mortgage obligations (cmo), were transacted between private parties (banks, sovereign funds, pension funds, hedge funds, private equity funds, AIG), outside of exchanges. The quants used algorithms (specifically, Gaussian copula) to price these mortgage-backed securities and swaps, and the software models blew up when real estate values plummeted and defaults skyrocketed. We've covered this topic ad nauseum.

For equities, we have the NYSE, NASDAQ, and other stock exchanges around the world. For fixed-income (bonds), derivatives (options, futures), and commodities, we have the CBOE and COMEX exchanges, for instance.

How about the buyers of these swaps open up their kimonos, and expose these assets? If they don't like the mark to market pricing, put them all onto an exchange, where all parties can see the composition of assets, and then let the markets decide how much they are really worth. If that means they are only worth 20 cents on the dollar, so be it--let them take a bath on them. That's better than burying it in their portfolio, pretending they aren't there. And once exposed, perhaps they are worth more than current panic levels....maybe they would get 60 cents on the dollar. Mark to market accounting prices these assets at liquidation levels, so they would be lucky to get 10 cents on the dollar. The underlying environment is that over 90% of mortgages are not delinquent--yet mark to market valuation prices in a 30% default rate.

Banks have what consumers are experiencing: 401K syndrome. Individuals aren't even opening up their mail because they are scared to see how much their 401K statements have declined.

During the Savings and Loan (FSLIC) crisis, the RTC was formed to consolidate these bad loans, write them down, price them, and sell them off. Granted, today's financial crisis is orders of magnitude greater, but the concept should be the same. Put a Bill Seidman in charge of disposing the assets.

To just sit on the these toxic assets--hoping home balance sheets will magically improve, and defaults will magically decrease--is lunacy if unemployment keeps rising.

In other words, because these transactions were synthetic, outside the auspices of an exchange and subject to mispricing, wouldn't it make sense to put them all into an exchange, and have markets price them in a transparent environment?

For instance, on a micro level, when a borrower defaults, no one knows how much that house is worth anymore. Other homes in the neighborhood are affected, and the more foreclosures, the more distorted the pricing. But put them up into an auction in a foreclosure sale, and the market determines the value of that house--and other homes in the neighborhood.

It seems logical, but I'm not sure the government will figure it out. They're just going to throw more good money at bad money, bailing out special interest groups, and distorting market pricing even more, prolonging any chance of a bottoming out process.


Having said that, the government doing the exact wrong thing makes it easier for investors. Just keep playing the reflation thesis.

Another chart which needs no explanation...

This chart from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank website (I'm not making this up) illustrates money supply expansion by the Fed in lending cash to banks in exchange for their toxic assets. Notice the spike on the right side of the graph, which represents the creation of dollars out of thin air.